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Abstract 
This article draws mostly (but not entirely) on new institutional economics to consider the 
likely behaviours of non-government conservation organizations and the implications of these 
behaviours for biodiversity conservation. It considers how institutional factors may result in 
behaviour of conservation NGOs diverging from their objectives, including their support for 
biodiversity conservation; examines aspects of rent capture and conservation alliances; 
specifies social factors that may restrict the diversity of species supported by NGOs for 
conservation; considers bounded rationality in relation to the operation of conservation 
NGOs; and using game theory, shows how competition between NGOs for funding can result 
in economic inefficiencies and narrow the diversity of species supported for conservation. It 
also considers generally how the social role of conservation NGOs might be assessed. 
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1 Introduction 
Drawing mostly on aspects of new institutional economics, this article examines institutional 
factors that may influence the behaviour of non-governmental conservation bodies and their 
implications for biodiversity conservation. Principal-and-agent problems are shown to be 
relevant, the question of rent capture is discussed, and several influences on selection by 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of focal species for their conservation efforts (such 
as whether they favour species that are more human-like, or charismatic or which could 
generate significant local impact on incomes via tourism generation) are considered. The 
competitive efficiency of NGOs in securing funding for promoting the conservation of 
different species, as well as the possible impact of this competition on the extent of 
conservation of biodiversity, is examined using analysis based on the theory of games. It is 
doubtful if this type of competition is efficient in promoting biodiversity conservation to the 
extent achievable. Furthermore, the theory outlined indicates that the conservation strategies 
adopted by NGOs may not be cost-effective. However, drawing on views presented by 
Hagedorn (1993), it is argued that the role of conservation NGOs should not be assessed 
solely on their economic efficiency but the political acceptability of their contributions to 
policy should also be taken into account, as well as other factors. A multidimensional 
approach is required to assess the role of such bodies in society. Furthermore, even if the 
actions of NGOs are not perfect in conserving biodiversity, it may not be possible to create 
institutions that give superior results. 
So far, there appears to have been little application of institutional economics to the 
behaviour of NGOs, such as conservation organizations, although there have been attempts by 
political scientists and sociologists to adopt institutional approaches to wildlife conservation 
as pointed out, for example, by Haas (2004). However, it seems likely that the theories, for 
example, of Niskanen (1971) about the behaviour of bureaucracies, aspects of the theory of 
games, theories of group behaviour as outlined by Olson (1965), Simon’s views on 
administrative man (Simon 1961) and the new institutional economics championed by 
Williamson (1975, 1986) would be applicable. In addition, some aspects of old or traditional 
institutional economics appear to be relevant.  
The purpose of the article is to explore the relevance of institutional economics to the 
behaviour of conservation organizations and to assess the predicted performance of such 
organizations in pursuing their conservation goals, giving examples where possible, and to 
consider factors that may restrict the ability of their strategies to conserve biodiversity. The 
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objective of the exercise is to explore theoretical possibilities as a first step towards further 
analysis and possible empirical work. 
Conservation bodies are usually concerned with ‘ensuring’ the supply of environmental 
goods and avoiding the production of public environmental bads. The goods (or bads) 
concerned are usually shared by a considerable number of persons either partially or 
completely in contrast to private goods. These are commodities for which markets are missing 
or partially missing. Nevertheless, the goods involved are not necessarily pure public goods or 
pure public bads. Many are mixed goods (Tisdell 2005: 113-118). The activities of NGOs 
often generate social conflict in the case of mixed goods. This is because NGOs may try to 
limit or restrict the exploitation of these resources by those who want to use them as a private 
good. The aim of the NGOs is to benefit those who obtain utility from the resources as a 
collective good. For example, the efforts by Greenpeace and other organizations to stop 
whaling by the Japanese benefits those who collectively value the free existence of whale 
populations but brings Greenpeace into conflict with Japanese whalers and Japanese 
consumers of whale meat. Even when public goods or bads are involved there can be social 
resentment. For example, some members of the public may believe that NGOs lobby for 
excessive public funding of conservation projects in some cases. 
The methods that NGOs use to contribute to the supply of public or quasi-public 
conservation goods are varied. They may, for instance, raise funds from the public (or their 
members) to directly provide the good, for example, a protected area; try to convince private 
individuals to supply the good and assist them to do so, and lobby governments to provide 
funds for the NGO’s conservation efforts or persuade the government directly to supply the 
focal environmental good of interest to the NGO. 
The Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust (YEPT) in New Zealand, for example, has as its prime 
goal the conservation of the Yellow-eyed Penguin (YEP) Megadyptes antipodes, which is 
listed by The World Conservation Union (IUCN) as an endangered species. To pursue its 
mission, the Trust raised funds initially from the public and was subsequently also able to 
obtain some funding from the New Zealand Government. This funding continues and the 
Trust has also obtained funding from some private companies. The Trust disseminates 
information about the conservation status of the YEP, engages directly in programmes to 
conserve it and has acquired a limited amount of land for the purpose of directly protecting 
this species. As well, it encourages landholders to covenant land (that is, ocean shore areas) 
suitable for the conservation of the YEP, gives landholders advice on the conservation of the 
YEP on their land, and so on. It also conducts research, has a small permanent staff, and 
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makes use of local volunteers in its activities. It is able to exert some political pressure on the 
government to ensure that its policies do not threaten the survival of the YEP. Thus, it 
performs all of the types of functions mentioned above. 
While many conservation NGOs combine all these functions, not all do. Some for 
example, do not directly supply any environmental goods but merely act as political pressure 
groups, trying to influence public policy by lobbying and by the strategic dissemination of 
information. The Australian Liberal-National Party Government while in power in the early 
part of this century moved to reduce public funding for the latter type of institutions. 
In this article I will consider in turn how the objectives of conservation NGOs may be 
influenced by institutional factors, the relevance of the bounded rationality of individuals to 
the activities of these NGOs, and how efficient they are likely to be in pursuing conservation 
objectives. This will be followed by a broader assessment of the social value of these 
organizations and some discussion of the relevance of traditional institutional economics to 
the evolution of conservation NGOs. 
2 Institutional Factors and the Objectives of Conservation NGOs 
Conservation NGOs, especially large ones, are liable to be influenced by principal-and-agent 
problems, of the type outlined, for example, by Perloff (2004: 689, 722). Emphasis on the 
importance of principal-and-agent problems in large organizations is by no means new. For 
instance, Berle and Means (1932) emphasized its importance in public corporations. They 
argued that shareholders have only limited control over the behaviour of the managers of 
public companies. This subsequently became the basis of many theories of the behaviour of 
business firms. It was argued that managerial goals modify the behaviour of business firms 
(Tisdell and Hartley 2008: Ch. 7). The members of conservation NGOs may be unable or 
unwilling to exert control over their administrators and employees for similar reasons (mostly 
the transaction costs involved) to those observed in the case of large public corporations. 
National and international NGOs may be particularly prone to the agency problem. Many 
members may find it too costly to attend annual general meetings and participate in 
decision-making by the NGO. The problem is likely to be less acute in the case of locally 
based community NGOs. 
The larger the size and the greater the geographical spread of a conservation NGO, the 
more likely are agency problems to be present. The more likely too is its management to be in 
the hands of staff, many of whom may not be members of the NGO, or who may place their 
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personal interest above that of rank-and-file members. The agency problem implies that 
managers or staff of NGOs have some scope to pursue their own goals as distinct from those 
of the NGO. 
Given the theory of bureaucracy as outlined by Niskanen (1971), and similar managerial 
theories of the behaviour of large public companies (Penrose 1959; Marris 1964) managers 
(staff) of conservation NGO might be primarily interested in the growth of their organisation 
and/or in obtaining sufficient funding to ensure its continuing existence. While some rank-
and-file members of the NGO may also want this, the NGO’s managers may be more inclined 
to compromise the conservation objectives of the NGO to obtain increased funds for their 
NGO. 
They may, for example, form alliances with bodies mainly interested in economic 
development, either to obtain funds directly from these bodies or via a joint approach to 
government. The reason given for the alliance by the NGO’s executive might be that with the 
alliance, the conservation NGO will have some influence on the nature of development but 
without the alliance it has none. Therefore, compromise is necessary to ensure that developers 
take some account of conservation. The extent to which this is really the case and how much 
compromise is necessary to ensure conservation influence is unclear. However, Figure 1 may 
help to illustrate some of the issues. 
 
 
Figure 1: Compromise of conservation goals as an option for a conservation NGO 
Source: own figure 
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In Figure 1, curve ABCD indicates the amount of funding that a conservation NGO can 
expect as a function of the degree to which it is prepared to compromise its conservation goals 
as measured by an indicator in the range 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. This figure shows that the NGO can 
increase its funding by engaging in some compromise but will lose funds if it is too 
compromising. Probably in most cases, D is lower than A because a conservation NGO that is 
too compromising will lose its credibility as a conservation organization. 
If the managers of the NGO act as Niskanen-type bureaucrats, they will favour the degree 
of compromise shown by x1 because this maximises the funds available to the NGO. In effect, 
their indifference curves would be a series of horizontal lines of which I11I11 indicates one. If 
the members of the NGO are strongly committed conservationists, they may, however, favour 
no compromise and prefer situation A. Their preferences would be indicated by a series of 
vertical indifference curves (not shown) with situations further to the left being favoured. In 
large organizations, however, it is possible that situation C rather than A will prevail if the 
bureaucrats are merely interested in the amount of funding obtained for their organization. 
Because of agency problems, members of the NGO may not be able to control a large NGO’s 
managers effectively. Of course, particularly in smaller and more localised NGOs where 
members can exert greater control over management, management may be unable to deviate 
so far from the conservation goals of the principals of the NGO. In moderately sized NGOs, it 
is possible that the ‘effective’ indifference curves are like those represented by I1I1 in Figure 
1. This results in a degree of compromise corresponding to x0 because the actions of the 
NGO’s managers are restricted by its members. The situation has some similarities to that 
outlined by Williamson (1964) when developing the theory of behaviour of managers in 
public companies. 
3 Rent Capture and Conservation Alliances 
When public demand for conservation goods grows rapidly, this growth may generate 
possible rents for those engaged in the facilitation of their provision. An interesting question 
is who captures these rents? In some cases, it may be executives in conservation NGOs but it 
can also be public servants and to a lesser extent academics. Consider the following case. 
The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), (a large conservation NGO in Australia) 
formed an alliance with the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) (a peak farmers’ pressure 
group) in 1989 to promote the Landcare Programme. The aim of this project was to encourage 
farmers to take more care of their land for conservation purposes. As a result of their joint 
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approach to the Australian Government, these NGOs were able to achieve a large amount of 
government funding for the project, the Landcare Programme which is still continuing. 
Possibly the interest of the ACF in the project was to extend its range of influence and that of 
the NFF was to create a more favourable impression of the role of farmers in conservation. 
Since participation in the programme by farmers was voluntary and subsidised by the 
government, it was clearly quite acceptable to farmers. Whether or not the ACF itself 
expected to obtain more funding from the government or ensure continuing support for its 
funding from the government as a result of its decision is unclear but it is possible. The ACF 
obtains some funds from the government and private contributions to this NGO are tax 
deductible. 
This alliance was very favourable to the Australian Liberal-National Party Government 
which wanted to partially privatise Telstra, a state-owned telecommunications enterprise. This 
plan was unpopular with farmers who feared that rural telecommunications services might 
suffer as a result of partial privatisation of this state enterprise. As a ‘carrot’ to farmers, the 
Australian Government announced that it would fund partially its support for Landcare from 
the funds obtained by the partial sale of Telstra. This move helped to placate farmers and was 
looked on favourably by conservationists. 
The ACF gained virtually no control over the Landcare Programme. Most funds for the 
programme are channelled through government departments, mainly the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and are administered by the government. It is possible that 
public servants have captured most of the rents and the ACF obtained little, if any of those. 
Considerable red tape (transaction costs) appears to be involved in application for community 
funding under the programme and government bureaucrats may now be the main 
beneficiaries. The ‘red tape’ involved helps to keep public servants in employment. A further 
problem is that with strict accountability rules in the public service, much of the red tape may 
be difficult to eliminate. Thus, the original alliance between the ACF and the NFF has 
evolved in a way which may not have been fully envisaged by the partners when they 
proposed the Landcare Programme. 
Similar issues seem to have arisen in relation to the European Unions’ reformed Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP has been reformed and continues to be reformed so that it is 
more environmentally friendly but the transaction costs involved in the new policy seem to be 
very high even though the actual transfers to civil servants for administering the scheme are 
not known. Although the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) was invited to participate in 
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the planning of the reformed scheme, it declined; possibly because it was afraid of being 
compromised. 
Note that environmental NGOs are not being blamed for ‘rent’ capture by public servants. 
They may, however, be used strategically by public servants in the process of rent capture as 
‘pawns’ in the game. If the public demands greater supplies of a particular environmental 
good, this provides scope for public administrators to capture a substantial portion of the 
public funding of policies to bring about that supply. Mechanisms for examining the 
cost-effectiveness of public administration appear to be weak. For example, the public (and 
even politicians) may have limited access to information about the activities of public 
administrators and market-type competition mechanisms do not apply. 
4 Social Influences on the Selection by NGOs of Focal Species for 
Conservation Efforts – Factors Restricting the Diversity of Species 
Favoured 
Conservation NGOs may favour promotion of a narrow range of species of wildlife for 
conservation. Metrick and Weitzman (1996, 1998) suggest that these are likely to be species 
that are more charismatic than others and of which the members are larger in size. It has also 
been claimed that humans like to favour the conservation of species that are more human-like 
than others (Plous 1993; DeKay and McClelland 1996; Gunnthorsdottir 2001) presumably 
because humans have greater empathy for these. This suggests a preference for mammals over 
other taxa and probably species with eyes placed forward on the skull.  
While there is some support for these views (Tisdell et al. 2006), the situation is more 
complex than appears at first sight because there seems to be a high degree of social support 
for survival of some non-mammalian species, such as some species of turtles (Tisdell et al. 
2005). In line also with the views of traditional institutionalists, there is evidence that social 
attitudes of individuals to the survival of different species of wildlife are to a large extent 
socially (culturally) conditioned (Tisdell et al. 2006). Furthermore, if portrayals of species 
(e.g., in folk tales and stories, cartoons) repeatedly emphasize or exaggerate the human-like 
appearance or qualities of species, they may alter human attitudes to them. Again, humans 
may prefer species that seem soft and cuddly - children prefer such objects. Some writers, 
therefore, argue that conservation NGOs excessively focus their conservation efforts on the 
conservation of charismatic species to the neglect of other species, e.g. keystone species that 
may be very important in relation to the maintenance of biodiversity. 
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In their defence, some conservation bodies argue that without an emphasis on flagship and 
charismatic species, they would collect a much smaller amount of funds which would 
adversely affect their overall conservation impact. Even though the outcome may not be 
optimal, it is the best attainable outcome, in the view of some NGOs, given the social 
circumstances. Furthermore, some of the species may be umbrella species and thus their 
conservation could result in the conservation of other valued species. This is because 
conservation of the habitat of the focal umbrella species also incidentally conserves other 
species.  
Of course, not all conservation NGOs focus their activities on a single species. Some use 
charismatic species for fund raising purposes but are engaged in broader conservation 
activities. The World Wide Fund for Nature uses a single species to symbolize the WWF, 
namely the giant panda. It seems to be quite common for NGOs in their drives for donations 
to use a single charismatic species that has emotional appeal to the public. In some cases, the 
funds collected by the NGOs are ‘fungible’ and help conserve species that are not highlighted 
by NGOs in their promotion campaigns. There is little doubt that some conservation 
organizations exploit charismatic wildlife species to obtain funds for the organization itself. 
For example, an Australian study of funding for the conservation of the koala and the northern 
hairy-nosed wombat found that although the koala was not endangered that funding for its 
conservation was much greater than for the critically endangered hairy-nosed wombat (Tisdell 
and Swarna Nantha 2007). Reasons could be that the koala is better known to the public, it is 
regarded as more human-like, and it is a mixed economic good whereas, at this time, the 
northern hairy-nosed wombat is a pure public good and is less well known. 
The koala is a mixed economic good because it is a private good in koala parks and zoos 
and is widely used as an icon for promotional purposes. Campaigns ‘to save’ the koala are 
likely to be supported by owners of koala parks and zoos, possibly partly to buy moral 
worthiness. In part, there may be bias of conservation bodies in favour of species that are 
mixed goods. By contrast, the northern hairy-nosed wombat is a pure public good (Tisdell and 
Swarna Nantha 2007). It is confined to a forest reserve where scientists are trying to increase 
its population. It is not allowed in zoos or private collections, and the public is excluded from 
the reserve containing its remnant population. 
Sometimes conservation NGOs directly conserve mixed economic goods or quasi-public 
goods themselves by relying on economic exclusion possibilities. For example, the Otago 
Peninsula Trust in New Zealand is instrumental in protecting a colony of the Northern Royal 
Albatross Diomedea sanfordi at Taiaroa Head. This species is listed by the IUCN as 
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endangered. Visitors pay to see this albatross colony at relatively close range (Tisdell 1990: 
Ch. 7; Higham 2001). The colony nests at this site. Their payments constitute the major 
source of funds for this NGO and in recent years the Trust has been able to obtain a financial 
surplus from operations of its Royal Albatross colony which it has used to subsidise other 
conservation activities (The Otago Peninsula Trust 2005). Similarly, the Mareeba Wetland 
Foundation manages a wetland wildlife reserve in the Atherton Tablelands in Northern 
Queensland (Australia). A substantial amount of its funds are obtained from visitors to this 
wetland who pay to enter this reserve which conserves a number of wild species in a natural 
setting. In both cases, components of the conserved commodity for which exclusion is 
possible help finance the organizations involved. 
Some conservation bodies may favour conservation projects that have a substantial and 
demonstrable local positive economic impact. This may help to generate local positive 
economic and other support for the NGO. However, conservation projects that have greatest 
local economic impact may not necessarily be those of greatest economic value. They may 
not, for example, maximise net social welfare – for instance, as estimated by the use of social 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) (Tisdell 2006a). 
This raises a social dilemma. Suppose, for example, that there are two species A and B that 
could be conserved in a local area by a similar level of investment but that funds are sufficient 
to conserve only one and their conservation is mutually exclusive. A social choice must be 
made about which one to conserve. If A is conserved, the net total economic value (TEV) of 
this is estimated to be $1 million and local income of $0.5 million is predicted to be 
generated. On the other hand, conservation of species B is estimated to yield a net TEV of $2 
million but only generate $0.1 million in income locally. If net TEV is to be maximised, the 
project to conserve B is the optimal social choice but if local economic impact is to be the 
deciding factor, conservation of species A would be the appropriate social choice. 
It is then a question of deciding what the appropriate social rules are. If the local 
community is, for example, very poor, it is possible that there would be a preference for the 
project that conserves species A. But what if the local community is rich? Should income 
transfers be made to the local community if this community is poor and it is decided to 
conserve species B? If so, how should these be made?  
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5 Bounded Rationality and the Operation of Conservation NGOs 
Individuals are undoubtedly limited in their rationality, their knowledge, and the span of their 
attention (Simon 1961). Conservation NGOs by their communication help focus individual’s 
attention on objects to be conserved. This may reduce their attention to other objects given 
that the attention spans of individuals are limited. Thus, the supply of public goods or 
quasi-public goods promoted by NGOs may be favoured by targeted members of the public. It 
is by no means certain that the composition of the transmitted information is ideal, even if an 
ideal can be defined for transmission of such information. 
In the case of wildlife conservation, provision of information by NGOs may be focused on 
species which are estimated to generate the greatest public financial support for the NGO. 
These may not, however, be the most valuable species to conserve. 
Furthermore, there might be more emphasis than is socially desirable on species likely to 
suffer a decline in their existing population than on those for which an increase in their 
existing population is desirable. Results from psychological economics indicate that 
individuals are willing to pay more to avoid loss of a valued commodity than to pay for an 
equivalent gain. This has been called the status quo or endowment effect (Knetsch 1989; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Kahneman et al. 1991). In general, individuals will be willing 
to pay more to avoid the loss of a species, the more imminent the loss is believed to be and 
the greater are the perceived adverse consequences of the loss. This may entice some 
conservation NGOs to exaggerate the degree of endangerment of their focal species and the 
extent of the adverse consequences of that loss (Tisdell 2006b). They hope as a result to 
marshal greater public action to conserve the species or secure more funds for the NGO. The 
public may not find it economic to scrutinise carefully the truth of statements made by NGOs. 
As in the lemons case (Akerlof 1970), there is also a risk that dishonest NGOs or 
inefficient ones may collect funds from the public to help conserve wildlife species by 
supplying misleading information to the public. Information is asymmetric in this case. With 
increasing use of the internet, this problem may increase. However, one reviewer suggested 
that this may not happen because the internet may be used to check on those NGOs that 
request donations via websites. In practice, this is optimistic because significant on-line fraud 
occurs. 
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6 The Efficiency of Conservation NGOs in Fund Raising and How Their 
Competition may Narrow the Diversity of Species Supported for 
Conservation 
It seems likely that conservation NGOs vary considerably in the competency with which they 
carry out their missions because they appear to be less subject to competitive discipline than 
business firms. However, they must receive adequate funding to survive and/or contributions 
of voluntary services. They do not seem to be subject to the discipline of possible takeovers 
by raiding companies as many businesses are, nor to the discipline imposed by bankers as 
many businesses are in some countries e.g., Germany. 
The question arises of just how efficient the organizational structures of individual 
conservation NGOs in promoting biodiversity conservation are and just how efficient is the 
whole array of extant NGOs in doing this. To what extent should such bodies be 
decentralised? What is the best organizational form for NGOs to achieve their mission? Is for 
example a U-form (unitary form) or an M-form (multidivisional form) best (Williamson 
1986)? Should they have a peak-type of organization to represent their interests nationally and 
internationally, such as the IUCN. Hagedorn (1993) suggests that governments (politicians) 
prefer to deal with peak civil organizations because this reduces their political transaction 
costs. This suggests that NGOs are more likely to influence government policy if they have a 
peak organization. 
Sometimes, conservation NGOs duplicate the activities of one another, do not engage in 
co-ordinated action with one another, and may forgo scale economies as a result. On the other 
hand, larger scales of operations may have drawbacks because of managerial ‘slippage’ and 
greater knowledge deficiencies in larger organizations as well as a reduced sense of belonging 
by individuals contributing to the activities of the conservation body. 
Some simple game theory models can be used to illustrate the point: conservation NGOs in 
following their own self-interest may fail to promote biodiversity and by competing reduce 
the total net funds available to them collectively or even in some cases, individually. Suppose 
two conservation NGOs, A and B, and that each has two alternative strategies: promote 
species 1 or promote species 2. The net funds that they have donated depend upon which 
species they promote. 
There are several possibilities which can be illustrated by matrices. One possibility is 
illustrated in Table 1. The payoffs in the body of the matrix indicate the funds which the 
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NGOs obtain for promoting the conservation of the different species, say in millions of 
dollars. Imagine that in the absence of support by NGOs to promote their conservation, each 
of the species will disappear. However, assume that if a minimum of $2 million is spent on 
fostering the conservation of an individual species, it will survive. 
 
Table 1: Matrix used to illustrate the incentives of NGOs to concentrate on the 
promotion of the same species and the possible shortcomings of this 
 
  NGO B 
  Promote Species 1 
(B1) 
Promote Species 2 
(B2) 
 
Promote Species 1 (A1) 
 
(2,2) 
 
(2,6) NGO A Promote Species 2 (A2) 
 
(6,2) (2.5, 2.5) 
Source: own table 
If each NGO’s motive is to maximise its funds, then both will promote species 2. 
Consequently, species 1 receives no support and disappears but species 2 survives because the 
total promotional effort to save it equals $5 million. If the NGOs had been less selfish and had 
adopted either the combination of strategies (A1, B2) or (A2, B1) both species would have 
survived and collectively their funds would have been greater. Nevertheless, the outcome 
(A2,B2) prevails and forms a Nash equilibrium. The result is not, however, Pareto sub-optimal 
for the players as it would be in the prisoners’ dilemma case. Note that if 6 is replaced by 2.7 
in the matrix in Table 1, this would still result in the NGOs only promoting the conservation 
of species 2 if they follow their self interest and, once again, this results in a Nash 
equilibrium. This is an even more inefficient outcome than in the previous case because not 
only is there failure to achieve the maximum attainable level of biodiversity conservation but 
the overall cost of achieving the amount of biodiversity conservation obtained is higher than 
when more species are conserved. If either strategies (A1, B2) or (A2, B1) are adopted both 
species are conserved at an overall cost of $4.7 million but when strategy (A2, B2) is adopted 
only one species is conserved at the overall cost of $5 million. 
If we assume that the goal of the NGOs is to maximize the number of species conserved 
subject to the attainable set of collective possibilities, it can be seen that there is failure to 
achieve this in the above cases. From this point of view, there is collective organizational 
inefficiency. Furthermore, the collective costs of achieving a given degree of biodiversity are 
not necessarily minimized, as is evident from the second example. The goals of the NGOs are 
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not always pursued in a manner which minimizes the collective costs of achieving a particular 
biodiversity outcome. In other words, the strategies of NGOs may not be collectively 
cost-effective. This indicates the presence of a type of economic inefficiency. 
A Pareto sub-optimal case (for NGOs) is illustrated in the matrix in Table 2. In the case 
shown there, both players (NGOs), acting in their selfish interest, promote species 2. They 
obtain $0.75 million each as a result. This is a Paretian sub-optimal outcome from their point 
of view and the total promotional expenditure of $1.5 million is insufficient to save species 2. 
Neither species is saved, even though it is possible to save both by selecting either strategies 
(A1, B2) or (A2, B1). Once again, there is inefficiency in achieving the collective goal of 
maximizing biodiversity conservation. This is not to say that all Nash solutions in the 
prisoners’ dilemma case will result in failure to save all the focal species. For instance, if in 
Table 2 the payoffs corresponding to (A2, B2) were (1.5, 1.5), the total promotional effort for 
species 2 is $3 million. Thus, species 2 survives (but not species 1) given the assumption that 
an expenditure of $2 million is required to ensure the survival of a species. Nevertheless, in 
both cases, the selfish actions of NGOs result in less biodiversity conservation than is 
attainable. 
Table 2: Matrix to show a prisoners’ dilemma type problem and failure of NGOs to 
promote biodiversity 
 
  NGO B 
  Promote Species 1 
(B1) 
Promote Species 2 
(B2) 
 
Promote Species 1 (A1) 
 
(2,2) 
 
(2,6) NGO A Promote Species 2 (A2) 
 
(6,2) (0.75,0.75) 
Source: own table 
A third related case can also be envisaged. This is illustrated by Table 3. In this case, the self 
interest of each of the NGOs is to co-ordinate their strategies so that they do not accidentally 
promote the same species. If both NGOs promote species 1 it will survive but not species 2. If 
both promote species 2 neither species will survive. This is based on the assumption (stated 
above) that each species requires a promotional expenditure of a minimum of $2 million to 
survive. 
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Table 3: Matrix to illustrate a co-ordination problem for NGOs 
 
  NGO B 
  Promote Species 1 
(B1) 
Promote Species 2 
(B2) 
 
Promote Species 1 (A1) 
 
(2,2) 
 
(3,3) NGO A Promote Species 2 (A2) 
 
(3,3) (0.75,0.75) 
Source: own table 
However, we should not conclude that duplication of effort by NGOs to conserve species is 
always unfavourable to conservation. For example, if effort is spread over many species, 
threshold levels of expenditure for the survival of only a few species may be reached. By 
concentrating conservation efforts on fewer species, it is possible that thresholds for the 
conservation of a larger number of species might be attained and greater biodiversity 
conserved. Again, however, there may not be social mechanisms to ensure that NGOs achieve 
the socially desired balance.  
7 How should the (Social) Role of Conservation NGOs be Assessed? 
The above discussion raises the issue of what is the appropriate way to assess the social role 
of conservation NGOs. Given the views of Hagedorn (1993), it would seem inappropriate to 
assess NGOs purely from an economic efficiency point of view; or in terms of the 
terminology he uses, on the basis of the quality of their decisions. In his view, attention 
should also be given to the political legitimacy and the political acceptability of their policy 
proposals. He is critical of the fact that agricultural economists have concentrated on the 
economic efficiency or quality of decisions by institutions or policies and have neglected the 
political sustainability of decision-making processes or proposals. 
If the most efficient policy alternatives are not politically acceptable, then they are 
irrelevant from a practical point of view. Proposed polices or institutional structures should be 
assessed taking into account both efficiency and political acceptability factors. For example, 
in Figure 2 the set bounded by OABCD may correspond to all policies that can address a 
particular social issue. A policy corresponding to point C would be the most efficient but not 
the most acceptable politically. The politically most acceptable one corresponds to point B. 
Should society choose point B or C or some point on the segment between these points? The 
policy corresponding to point C may maximize net social benefit using traditional CBA but 
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that corresponding to B may give a distribution of benefits that makes it relatively more 
acceptable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Efficient institutions and policies may not always be politically acceptable 
Source: own figure 
Another point to consider is that although an institutional structure does not provide the most 
efficient solution to a social problem it may still have net benefits and no other feasible 
political alternative may be available. Thus, conservation NGOs may make a positive 
contribution to the supply of public or quasi-public conservation goods; a contribution which 
would not be made in their absence. Their contribution seems to be a positive one even 
though not perfect. Furthermore, no other workable institutional arrangements may be 
possible which will do a better job of filling conservation gaps. To be more specific in 
relation to biodiversity conservation, even if conservation NGOs are neither as effective nor 
as efficient in promoting biodiversity conservation as they could be, their net contribution 
may be positive and superior institutional arrangements may not be possible. 
An additional factor to bear in mind is that conservation NGOs are a part of civil society. 
They may, therefore, act as useful counters to the power of the state, and they provide 
separate sources of information and expertise. This is valued in itself by those that favour 
open societies (Popper 2002). 
A 
O 
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x 
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Indicator of efficiency 
Indicator of 
political 
acceptability 
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Again, another positive social contribution of conservation NGOs (and other NGOs) is that 
they provide extra avenues for individuals to ‘belong’ to society. Most NGOs rely on 
volunteers and donations from individuals to function. They provide an alternative to the 
workforce for social recognition of individuals. They can help counter social alienation and 
build community spirit. The importance of this type of sociological (social) contribution of 
conservation NGOs has been documented by Buchan (2007) by means of case studies. This 
all suggests that institutions need to be assessed from a multidimensional point of view. 
8 Concluding Comments 
The analysis in this article is exploratory in the sense it applies behavioural theories mostly 
developed by new institutional economists to outline possible behaviours of conservation 
NGOs and assess the consequences of these behaviours. It was claimed that the administrators 
of NGOs may pursue goals different to those of rank-and-file members due to 
principal-and-agent phenomena and differing goals of the stakeholders. This is liable to result 
in some compromise of conservation goals by administrators of NGOs. Financial 
considerations may lead many conservation NGOs to concentrate on supporting a limited set 
of species for conservation (for example, charismatic ones) and they may take advantage of 
bounded rationality and asymmetry of information to bias the information they provide to the 
public. Application of game theory suggests that the competitive behaviour of conservation 
NGOs is less effective in promoting biodiversity conservation than it could be. It can result in 
fewer species being saved by the activities of NGOs than is attainable given their available 
strategies. Inefficiency can therefore arise in this case. Furthermore, the costs of conserving 
whatever species are conserved may be higher than it need be. 
It could, however, be argued that the role of conservation NGOs in society should be 
assessed from a broader angle. For example, the political role of such institutions may need to 
be taken into account as well as their role in facilitating social activities. There is as yet no 
easy way to assess the social value of these multidimensional attributes. 
This article has applied new concepts in economics, such as those developed in new 
institutional economies, to help analyse the behaviour of conservation NGOs and shed light 
on the economic and social issues raised by the development of these organizations. The 
analysis should be regarded as suggestive rather than definitive.  
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When considering the evolution of conservation NGOs and the types of missions or 
objectives they pursue, it is probably wise to study also cultural factors and changes in social 
values (see Tisdell et al. 2006) as suggested by traditional economic institutionalists. This is 
because prevailing values held in societies alter with the passage of time. To some extent, 
NGOs may contribute to this change. However, to a large extent, changes in social values are 
likely to be exogenous to individual NGOs. As these values change, some new NGOs may 
arise with missions that reflect the new set of values, some existing NGOs may disappear and 
other existing NGOs may reform their goals in order to survive financially. There is 
considerable scope for studying the dynamics of such change but this has not been attempted 
here. 
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